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I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose an individual is suffering from stress-related headaches, and the
individual becomes involved in legal proceedings in which this information is
relevant. If this individual lives in South Carolina and visits a psychologist
about headaches caused by job-related stress, his communications are not pro-
tected in legal proceedings by a statutory privilege.' However, if this individual
were a high school student in North Dakota complaining about school-related
stress, the student's confidential communications with a school guidance coun-
selor would be protected by a privilege.2 In contrast, if the individual were a
battered wife living in New Jersey, her communications to a social worker
about the stresses of her situation are not protected by a statutory privilege. A
uniform testimonial privilege for mental health professionals would provide
more consistent protection for similar mental health counseling and more cer-
tainty for the individuals seeking help from these professionals.
Testimonial privileges are evidentiary exceptions to the general rule that all
persons, when called upon to testify, must present all relevant facts to the
court.3 Privileges covering psychologists, psychotherapists, counselors, and social
workers are all designed to protect the confidentiality of therapeutic relation-
ships by limiting the disclosure of the patient's confidential communications in
legal proceedings. 4 Although the clients of some mental health professionals are
covered by a privilege, 5 not all professionals providing mental health services
have privileges to protect their clients' communications.6 Of the existing mental
1. South Carolina does have a privilege for "certain communications and observations" for individuals seek-
ing counseling, treatment, or therapy for drug problems from a "confidant." S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-140. A
confidant includes a "medical practitioner," a psychologist, a full-time staff member of a college or university
counseling center, a guidance counselor, or "any professional or paraprofessional staff member of a drug treat-
ment, education, rehabilitation, or referral center." Id. at § 44-53-110.
2. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.1 (1975).
3. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72 (3d. ed. 1984) [hereinafter MCCORMIcK]; 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses §
141 (1976); 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 252 (1957).
4. S. STONE & R. LIEBMAN, TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES 378-79 (1983).
5. For lists of statutes of privilege laws for clients of psychologists, physicians, and social workers, see S.
KNAPP & L. VANDECREEK, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS IN THE MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONS app. A (1987);
S. STONE, L. LIEBMAN, & R. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 240-46 (Supp. 1989).
6. Not all mental health professionals are covered by a privilege. However, counselors, psychologists, and
other professionals have professional codes of ethics that require these professionals to maintain their clients'
communications in confidence. Confidentiality is an ethical decision not to reveal clients' confidences. In contrast,
a privilege is a legal right not to testify in legal proceedings about a client's communications. G. COREY, M.
COREY. & P. CALLANAN, ISSUES AND ETHICS IN THE HELPING PROFESSIONS 170-74 (2d ed. 1984); L. FISCHER &
G. SORENSON, SCHOOL LAW FOR COUNSELORS. PSYCHOLOGISTS, AND SOCIAL WORKERS 13-16 (1985); D. HUM-
MEL, L, TALBUrr, & M. ALEXANDER, LAW AND ETHICS IN COUNSELING 53-55 (1985). See State v. Harris, 51
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health privileges, some are absolute, meaning that the privileges apply regard-
less of the court's need for the information in a particular legal proceeding.7
Other privileges are qualified because the privileges apply based on the court's
ad hoc determination of the particular need for the information in a particular
case.
8
One solution to the inequitable protection of clients' communications is to
enact a single, qualified privilege that covers all mental health professionals.
This Note discusses the current status of mental health privileges9 and proposes
a uniform privilege to provide more equitable coverage.10 This Note also dis-
cusses the policy arguments both for and against enacting the proposed
privilege."
II. CURRENT EXPLANATIONS FOR ENACTING PRIVILEGES
Although privileges historically were created by the courts, legislatures
have been the dominant creators of privileges since the nineteenth century.
1 2
Several theories have been proposed to explain the recognition of privileges for
some professional relationships but not for others. Among the current theories
are the utilitarian rationale, the privacy rationale, and the power theory.
A. The Utilitarian Rationale
According to the utilitarian rationale, legislatures should create privileges
when society is served more by encouraging a particular relationship than soci-
ety is hurt by the potential loss of information caused by the privilege." The
utilitarian rationale is the traditional justification offered for creating privi-
Wash. App. 807, 812-13, 755 P.2d 825, 828-29 (1988) (Although administrative regulations impose strict confi-
dentiality requirements, the confidentiality regulations do not reflect the existence of a general testimonial privi-
lege for mental health professionals.).
7. In re Gail D., 217 N.J. Super. 226, n.3, 525 A.2d 337, 340 n.3 (1987); MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at
§77; N. ROGERS & C. McEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 115 (1989).
8. State v. Mayhand, 298 N.C. 418, 428-29, 259 S.E.2d 231, 239 (1979) (judge may compel disclosure
under a qualified physician-patient privilege when disclosure is necessary for the proper administration of justice);
In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 494 Pa. 15, 60-61, 428 A.2d 126, 131 (1981) (absolute privilege rejected;
society has interests in every man's evidence and in basic fairness); MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 77; 25 C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5542, at 318 (1989).
9. See infra notes 12-56 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Part IV A.
11. See infra notes 57-116 and accompanying text.
12. Generally, courts defer to legislatures to create new privileges. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 706 (1972) (four members of Supreme Court suggesting that courts should yield to legislatures in creating
and defining privileges); People v. Dixon, 161 Mich. App. 388, 393, 411 N.W.2d 760, 763 (1987) (creation of
parent-child testimonial privilege best left to legislature); In re Parkway Manor Healthare Center, 448 N.W.2d
116, 121 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (court deferred to legislature to create a privilege for self-evaluation data);
People v. Doe, 61 A.D.2d 426, 434-35, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 381 (1978) (deferred to legislature to create parent-
child privilege); Cook v. King County, 9 Wash. App. 50, 52, 510 P.2d 659, 661 (1973) ("Although 'privilege' is a
common-law concept, the granting of a testimonial privilege is a recognized function of legislative power."); MC-
CORMICK, supra note 3, at § 75.
13. See generally S. KNAPP & L. VANDECREEK, supra note 5, at 8; MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at § 72;
Smith, Medical and Psychotherapy Privileges and Confidentiality: On Giving With One Hand and Removing
With the Other, 75 Ky. L.J. 473, 477 (1986-87).
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS' PRIVILEGE
leges. 14 Theorists have stated the criteria necessary for a privilege to meet the
utilitarian rationale in several ways.' 5 However, Dean Wigmore has perhaps
been the most influential theorist supporting the utilitarian view.16 Almost all
privileges enacted in the 1960s were evaluated according to Wigmore's four cri-
teria for evaluating a privilege. Wigmore's criteria are the following:
(1) Does the communication originate in the belief that it will not be disclosed? (2) Is
the inviolability of that confidence essential to achieve the purpose of the relationship?
(3) Is the relationship one that society should foster? (4) Is the expected injury to the
relationship, through fear of later disclosure, greater than the expected benefit to jus-
tice in obtaining later testimony?'1
The psychotherapist-patient privilege was one of the earliest mental health
professional privileges to satisfy the utilitarian rationale 8 and meet Wigmore's
criteria.' 9 First, communications between psychotherapists and patients origi-
nate with the belief that patients' communications will not be disclosed. Second,
successful therapy requires the maintenance of confidentiality. If patients do not
have the assurance of confidentiality, then patients will not feel free to divulge
their innermost thoughts and feelings to their psychotherapists, and therapy will
be less effective. Third, the public supports therapeutic relationships. Evidence
of this support includes federal and state money that is used to support psycho-
therapy; that states require psychotherapists to obtain training and a license;
and that prisons, hospitals, and schools make therapy available.20 Finally, if pa-
tients' communications are not privileged, the injury done to psychotherapy will
not be compensated by greater effectiveness in the administration of justice.2'
Proponents of other mental health privileges have used similar arguments to
meet Wigmore's criteria and satisfy the utilitarian rationale.22
14. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 523 Pa. 427, 567 A.2d 1357 (1989) (Larsen, J., dissenting) ("it is
generally conceded today that the sole justification for such privileges is . . . the social utility of the particular
relationship"); In re Embick, 351 Pa. Super. 491, 499-500, 506 A.2d 455, 460 (1986) ("There can be no doubt
that the purpose of the psychologist-client privilege is to encourage people to seek professional help for their
mental or emotional problems, and that purpose is best accomplished when people in need of psychotherapeutic
treatment know that what they tell their therapist during treatment will not be disclosed to anyone."); S. KNAPP
& L. VANDECREEK, supra note 5, at 8; S. STONE & R. LIEBMAN supra note 4, at § 7.02.
15. S. KNAPP & L. VANDECREEK, supra note 5, at 8-12; Saltzberg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers
and Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L. REv. 597, 600-01 (1980).
16. McCoRMICK, supra note 3, at § 72.
17. S. KNAPP & L. VANDECREEK, supra note 5, at 9. Wigmore advocated a privilege for husbands and wives,
government informers, priests, and attorneys. 8 J. WiGMORaa EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285 (Q.
McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). However, his criteria for establishing a privilege have been used to argue for estab-
lishing a privilege beyond these select few. See, e.g., sources cited infra note 22.
18. S. KNAPP & L. VANDaCREEK, supra note 5, at 7.
19. Id. at 9.
20. Id. at 10-11.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Robinson, Testimonial Privilege and the School Guidance Counselor, 25 SYRAcusE L. RaV.
911, 924-27 (1974) (school counselors); Note, Rape ictim-Crisis Counselor Communications: An Argument for
an Absolute Privilege, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. Rav. 1213, 1221-23 (1984) (rape crisis counselors).
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B. The Privacy Rationale
A second justification that commentators frequently use to justify privileges
is a privacy rationale.13 This rationale is based on the belief that human rela-
tionships are central to human dignity and should be free from state interfer-
ence.24 Supporters of this view value human dignity more than they value accu-
rate litigation. 25 Therefore, they argue, certain communications should be
protected by a privilege, without considering any greater benefit to society and
the legal system.26
C. The Power Theory
The power theory is a third rationale for explaining why legislatures have
created privileges for some professions and not for other professions. This
emerging rationale looks beyond the rationales offered by legislatures for estab-
lishing particular privileges, and instead looks to the political reality within leg-
islatures. The power theory is that the professions with the money and clients to
establish a strong lobby are the professions that receive privileges. 27 Profession-
als with poorer clients do not have the money nor the political clout to lobby for
privileges.
There has always been a strong connection between privilege laws and po-
litical influence.28 Privileges originated in the seventeenth century to protect the
professional honor of the English elite.29 Although professional honor has since
been abandoned as a stated justification for creating privileges, several commen-
tators theorize that political strength continues to influence the development of
privilege law. 0
III. THE CURRENT PATCHWORK PATTERN OF MENTAL HEALTH PRIVILEGES
Perhaps as a result of the political climate in legislatures, privileges have
developed in a patchwork manner throughout many states. For example, in
New Jersey, confidential communications with a doctor,31 psychologist, 32 victim
counselor,3 3 and marriage counselor 34 are covered. However, discussions with
school counselors or social workers are not protected. In Alabama, privilege
23. See generally, S. KNAPP & L. VANDECR3 K, supra note 5, at 12-13; McCoRMIcK, supra note 3, at § 72;
Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARy. L. REv. 1450, 1480 (1985) [hereinafter
Developments].
24. S. KNAPP & L. VANDECREEK, supra note 5, at 13.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Developments, supra note 23, at 1493-95; Smith, supra note 13, at 479.
28. Developments, supra note 23, at 1494.
29. Id.
30. 25 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 8, at § 5526; Developments, supra note 23, at 1494; Hayden,
Should There Be a Psychotherapist Privilege in Military Courts-Martial, 123 MIL L. REv. 38 (1989); Note, The
Ohio Physician-Patient Privilege: Modified, Revised, and Defined, 49 Oaio ST. LJ. 1147, 1151 (1989).
31. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.2 (West 1989).
32. Id. at § 45:14B-28 (West Supp. 1989).
33. Id. at § 2A:84A-22.12.
34. Id. at § 45:8B-29 (West 1978 and Supp. 1989).
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statutes have been enacted to cover counselors8 5 and psychologists.36 School
counselors and social workers are not covered by a statute.
In general, most states have enacted a psychotherapist-patient privilege.3 7
Other professions have been less successful in receiving privileges. For example,
nurses have not widely received the protection of privileges.38 The common law
did not provide a privilege for nurses, and only a few states have responded to
create a statutory privilege.39 Similarly, school counselors in thirty-two states
are unprotected by a specific statutory privilege.40 Marriage counselors, rape
counselors and social workers have received less complete coverage from privi-
lege statutes."
Commentators have noted that patients frequently receive treatment from
mental health professionals other than psychotherapists or doctors.42 In the
1970s, one study found that doctors and psychotherapists treated only sixteen
percent of those seeking treatment for mental problems.' 3 The study found that
social workers treated eighteen percent, nurses treated twenty-nine percent, and
various other professionals treated twenty-six percent of the patients seeking
treatment.4 In addition, the study also indicated that more than half of the
patients suffering from mental illnesses had incomes below the poverty line.45
These patients have an equal need for privileges, but these patients do not have
the funds or the political clout to lobby for privileges to cover the professionals
that are most accessible to poorer clients.
35. ALA. CODE § 34-8A-21 (1988).
36. ALA. CODE § 34-26-2 (1975).
37. See, e.g., CAL EVID. CODE § 1014 (West 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3734 (West Supp. 1990); ME.
R. EVID. 503 (West 1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.215 (Michie 1986); N.M. R. EvID. 504 (1986); N.D. R.
EVyD. 503 (1990-91); OR. REv. STAT. § 40.230 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAws § 5-37.3-3 (Supp. 1983).
38. 23 C. WRxOHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 5431, at 832.
39. Id.
40. The following states have adopted a school counselor-student privilege: Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 10-154a (1986); Idaho, IDAHO R. EvID. 516 (1987); Kentucky, KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.216 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988); Maine, MF REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A § 4008 (Supp. 1988); Michigan, MicH. CoMP.
LAws ANN. § 600.2165 (West 1986); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-809 (1989); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 49.290 (1986); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § &-53.4 (1988); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-
06.1 (1976); Ohio, Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Anderson Supp. 1988); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.,
70 § 6-115 (West 1989); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT. § 40.245 (1988); Pennsylvania, 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 5945
(Purdon 1982 and Supp. 1989); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-13-21.1 (1987); Wisconsin, Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 118.126 (West 1988).
41. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 17-39-107 (1989) (social workers); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146k
(1989) (sexual assault counselors); FLA. STAT. § 90.5035 (1988) (sexaul assault counselors); KY. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 335.170, 421.2151 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1989) (social workers, sexual assault counselor); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 16, § 53-A (1988) (sexual assault counselors); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-121 (1989)
(social workers); 1986 NEV. STAT. 49.252 (social workers); NJ. STAT. 2A:84A-22.15 (1987) (victim counselors);
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5945.1 (1988) (sexual assault counselors); Wyo. STAT. § 1-12-116 (1989) (family violence,
sexual assault, and victim counselors).
42. 25 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAH~m, supra note 8, at § 5526; Comment, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privi-
lege: Are Some Patients More Privileged Than Others?, 10 PAc. LJ. 801, 803-04 (1979) (citing NAT'L INST. OF
MENTAL HEALTH. DEP'T OF HEALTH EDUC. AND WELF. PUB. No. (ADM) 76-308, STAFFING OF MENTAL
HEALTH FACILITIES, UNITED STATES, 1974, 3 (1976)).
43. 25 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 8, at § 5525.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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Several cases illustrate the consequences of this patchwork approach to the
development of privileges. One example is the 1976 Alaska Supreme Court case
of Allred v. State.46 In Allred, the police took a suspect into custody for ques-
tioning. The suspect asked to see either the psychiatrist who ran a local drug
clinic or the clinic coordinator that had counseled the suspect.' Although the
clinic coordinator had treated the suspect, the coordinator was actually licensed
as a social worker rather than as a psychiatrist. Psychiatrists, but not social
workers, were covered by Alaska's privilege statutes. Because the police con-
tacted the clinic coordinator rather than the psychiatrist, the suspect's commu-
nications with the social worker were denied statutory protection because the
suspect spoke with the social worker rather than the psychiatrist.48
Similarly, in a 1985 Indiana case, a juvenile's statements to his caseworker
at a residential juvenile facility were not protected.4 1 Statutory privileges ex-
isted in Indiana for school counselors and for certified psychologists.50 Despite
these privileges, the juvenile's statements were admissible because a privilege
had not been created to specifically include juvenile caseworkers at residential
juvenile facilities, even though the caseworker's function was to provide services
similar to those that school counselors or certified psychologists provide in other
settings.
The consequences of patchwork development are also illustrated by Lipsey
v. State.51 In Lipsey, the Court of Appeals of Georgia held that a chaplain and
a behavior specialist were not covered by the state's privileges for psychiatrists
or psychologists.5 2 Both the chaplain and the behavior specialist were workers at
a community clinic. The chaplain performed intake evaluations, and the behav-
ior specialist held regular counseling sessions.5 3 In deciding that the psychologist
and psychiatrist privileges did not apply, the court said that confidential com-
munications to other mental health professionals arguably should be privi-
leged.54 However, the court could not extend a privilege since the legislature
had not felt a privilege was necessary. 55
Relying on legislatures to recognize privileges has led to the patchwork de-
velopment of privilege law and to inequitable consequences. Privileges have
been almost uniformly enacted for attorneys, psychotherapists, and clergy.5"
46. 554 P.2d 411 (Alaska 1976).
47. Id. at 413.
48. Although the court refused to extend the statutory psychotherapist-patient privilege to the social worker,
the court created a common-law privilege.to protect the suspect's statements. Id. at 422.
49. In re L.J.M. 473 N.E.2d 637 (Ind. App. 1985).
50. Id. at 642.
51. 170 Ga. App. 770, 318 S.E.2d 184 (1984).
52. Id. at 770-34, 318 S.E.2d at 184.
53. Id. at 771-72, 318 S.E.2d at 185-86.
54. Id. at 772, 318 S.E.2d at 187.
55. Id. See also Myers v. State, 251 Ga. 883, 310 S.E,2d 504 (1984) (communications between patient and
nurse at mental health unit not covered by psychiatrist-patient privilege); White v. State, 180 Ga. App. 185, 348
S.E.2d 728 (1986) (communications between defendant and social worker at a community center not covered by
psychologist-patient privilege); State v. Red Paint, 311 N.W.2d 182, 184 (N.D. 1981) (communications to execu-
tive director of juvenile institution not protected by privileges for attorneys, clergy, or school counselor privilege).
56. For surveys of privileges, see J. BUSH & W. TIEMANN, THE RirHT TO SILENCE app. I (3d. ed. 1989); S.
KNAPP & L. VANDECREEK, supra note 5, at app. A; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 17, at §§ 2285-86.
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However, professions with less wealthy clients have received less privilege pro-
tection. A single privilege covering all mental health professionals would provide
more equitable coverage to the clients of all mental health professionals.
IV. ENACTING A UNIFORM MENTAL HEALTH PRIVILEGE
A. A Proposed Privilege for Mental Health Professionals
To avoid the inequality created by the current system of enacting privi-
leges, legislatures should enact a single, qualified privilege that covers all mental
health professionals. The privilege might read as follows:
No mental health professional shall testify in any civil or criminal proceeding concern-
ing confidential communications made to the professional by the client in the course of
the relationship or concerning advice to the client. However, a judge may compel dis-
closure either at or prior to trial if, in the circumstances of the case, society's interest
in the administration of justice outweighs society's interest in fostering the professional
relationship.
(a) "Mental health professionals" include all persons who participate in the diag-
nosis or treatment of mental or emotional conditions. Mental health professionals in-
clude, but are not limited to, psychiatrists, psychologists, licensed professional counsel-
ors, school counselors, social workers, and individuals who have been trained to
provide services at mental health centers.
(b) "Mental health centers" include any clinic or other facility that provides inpa-
tient or outpatient service for the diagnosis or treatment of an individual's mental
condition.
This proposed privilege is unique because no state currently has a single,
qualified privilege that covers all mental health professionals. However, several
states have enacted privileges that have some similarities to this proposal. For
example, North Carolina's statutory scheme is one alternative that has some
similarities to the proposed privilege. North Carolina has enacted a series of
qualified privileges, but these privileges cover only specific mental health profes-
sionals. North Carolina's privilege statutes cover psychologists,57 school counsel-
ors,58 family therapists, 59 social workers,80 and counselors!" The advantage of
the proposed privilege is that a court can extend protection beyond these speci-
fied professionals. In the context of a particular case, a court can weigh the
need for the information against society's interests in protecting the professional
relationship.82 For example, a court could extend the protection of the privilege
to volunteers on suicide prevention lines. 63
57. N.C. Gr.N, STAT. S 8-53.3 (1989).
58. Id. at 5 8-53.4.
59. Id. at § 8-53.5.
60. Id. at 5 8-53.7.
61. Id. at § 8-53.8.
62. See Infra discussion under Part C 1.
63. Kentucky has recently enacted a "counselor-client" privilege that is similar to North Carolina's scheme.
Rather than have a series of qualified privileges that cover specific mental health professionals, Kentucky includes
a specfic list of protected professionals within a single statute. Regardless of the statutory structure, like North
Carolina, Kentucky's privilege does not allow courts to extend the statutory privilege to any profession that is not
listed in the statute. See Ky. H.B. 214, § 28, Rule 506 (1990).
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Another existing alternative to the proposed privilege is Vermont's "pa-
tient's privilege.1', 4 Unlike North Carolina's privileges, the patient's privilege
does not merely cover a specified list of professionals. The "patient's privilege"
covers the patients of doctors, dentists, nurses, and qualified mental health pro-
fessionals that are "designated by the Commissioner of Mental Health."0 51 Un-
like the privilege statutes in most states, Vermont's legislature has delegated
some of its power to create privileges to the Commissioner of Mental Health.
The Commissioner can add additional professionals to the list of those covered
by the privilege.6 Despite the Commissioner's ability to cover additional profes-
sionals, Vermont's list of protected professionals is specific because only the pro-
fessionals designated by the legislature or the Commissioner are covered. Like
the proposed privilege, Vermont's privilege may reduce the impact of politics in
the legislatures by delegating some authority to the Commissioner.
There are at least two difficulties with Vermont's privilege. First, Ver-
mont's system may be politically difficult to enact. Legislatures are perhaps re-
luctant to share their privilege-making power with another official. A second
difficulty with Vermont's system is that the system does not as closely meet the
needs of justice as well as the proposed privilege does. Like systems in which the
legislature promulgates all of the privileges, Vermont's system cannot rise to
meet the needs of an individual in the context of a particular case. For example,
suppose a rape victim speaks to a rape crisis counselor in Vermont and legal
proceedings arise in which these conversations are relevant information. If the
legislature or the Commissioner has not previously specified that rape crisis
counselors are covered by a privilege, then the victim in that particular legal
proceeding would not receive the protection of a privilege.6 7 The proposed privi-
lege has the advantage of giving courts the ability to consider the interests of
justice and to react as cases arise without having to wait for a legislature or a
commissioner to enact a privilege before the court can apply one.
64. VT. R. EVID. 503.
65. VT. R. Evw. 503(a).
66. Vermont's Commissioner of Mental Health has used the authority delegated by the statute to designate
specific individuals as qualified professionals, rather than designating whole groups of professionals. Currently an
individual who works as a staff member at one of Vermont's community mental health centers may apply for
designation. The individual's education and experience is reviewed before the Commissioner designates the indi-
vidual as a qualified mental health professional. Generally, the individuals who are designated are those individu-
als who work in emergency services, such as those who sign commitment papers. Telephone interview with Dena
Monahan, Assistant Attorney General (assigned to represent the department of mental health) (August 2, 1990);
Reporter's Notes, V.R.E. 503 (1983). Although this procedure does help insure that the individuals receiving the
privilege are qualified, the privilege has been applied too narrowly to cover mental health professionals in general.
For example, school counselors and marriage counselors are not protected by the application of this privilege. Even
if individual counselors could apply for designation as a mental health professional, Vermont's system of designat-
ing professionals individually would not be a workable alternative to the proposed privilege. Reviewing the appli-
cations may be too heavy an administrative burden, and the system may be too costly.
67. Although the victim may not receive the protections of a privilege, other rules of evidence may prevent
the victim's statements from being admitted. See infra text accompanying notes 103-06.
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B. Why Enact a Privilege to Cover Mental Health Professionals?
1. Necessary to Encourage Communications
Despite the fact that all states, including North Carolina and Vermont,
have privileges that protect some mental health professionals, opponents to the
proposed privilege may question whether mental health privileges are neces-
sary.68 McCormick notes that many have questioned the need for the physician-
patient privilege based upon the belief that the average physician's patient gives
no thought to the remote possibility that the patient's communications could be
disclosed in legal proceedings.6 9 Since many privileges are enacted based upon
the utilitarian justification of encouraging communications, some may consider
the privilege to be largely ineffective in achieving its stated objective.70
To support this view, privilege opponents may cite a study conducted in
1987 by Daniel Shuman and Myron Weiner. Shuman and Weiner conducted an
extensive empirical study to determine the effects of a privilege covering psycho-
therapists in three states and two Canadian provinces. 1 Lay persons, therapists,
psychotherapy patients, and judges were surveyed. The study disclosed that lay
persons were generally unaware of whether their state had a privilege.72 Simi-
larly, most patients were unsure if their state had a privilege statute; only six
percent indicated that they would have started therapy sooner if they had
known that a privilege existed.73 Shuman and Weiner's data seems to indicate
that the existence of a privilege has very little impact on an individual's decision
to seek therapy.74
Shuman and Weiner's study may demonstrate that mental health privileges
are not effective. According to the frequently advanced utilitarian view, privi-
leges are necessary to encourage clients to communicate more freely with the
professional by giving clients the assurance that their communications with the
professional will not be disclosed in legal proceedings.75 If Shuman and Wei-
ner's study is correct, people still seek professional services even though they are
unaware that privileges exist. Therefore, a privilege for mental health profes-
sionals is ineffective and prevents otherwise relevant evidence from being used
in legal proceedings.
Although privilege opponents may cite Shuman and Weiner's study to sup-
port their argument that a mental health privilege is unnecessary, the results of
the study do not conclusively indicate that a privilege is ineffective. The study
68. 25 C. WuHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 8, at § 5522.
69. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at § 98.
70. Id.
71. D. SHUMAN & M. WEINER, THE PSYCHOTHIERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE 81 (1987).
72. Id. at 105. Of the lay persons surveyed, only 25% knew or correctly guessed whether a privilege existed
in their state or province. Id.
73. Id. at 107.
74. Id. at 135. See generally, S. KNAPP & L. VANDECREEK, supra note 5, at 31-32 (discussing other privi-
lege studies).
75. Robinson, supra note 22, at 924-26; Savrin, The Social Worker-Client Privilege Statutes: Underlying
Justifications and Practical Operations, 6 PROB. LJ. 243, 244-45 (1985); Comment, An Analysis of the 1972
South Dakota Counselor-Student Privilege Statute, 19 S.D.L. REV. 378, 380 (1974); Note, Testimonial Privi-
leges and the Student-Counselor Relationship in Secondary Schools, 56 IowA L. REV. 1323, 1332-37 (1971).
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has limited value for several reasons. First, it was conducted in only three
states, and the study measured the reactions of only psychotherapy patients.
The clients of no other professionals were surveyed; for example, social workers'
clients were not surveyed. Second, Shuman and Weiner failed to study the ef-
fects on the professional of having a privilege statute covering their profession.
Many professionals are uncomfortable with the possibility that they could be
called to disclose information about a client in a legal proceeding. As a result of
this discomfort, a professional may be less aggressive about encouraging reluc-
tant clients to communicate. A professional's discomfort with the potential of
being subpoenaed also can affect the professional's nonverbal behavior.76 A pro-
fessional can discourage further communication about a topic with behaviors
such as lack of eye contact, a tense posture, lack of natural gestures, or verbal
responses that indicate selective inattention to clients' disclosures. 7 Therefore,
although the participants in one limited study indicated that they were unaware
of whether a privilege existed, privileges may still be justified on the basis of the
utilitarian rationale.
2. Protects Patients' Rights to Privacy
The utilitarian rationale is not the sole justification that proponents can use
to justify adopting the proposed privilege. A second justification is that proposed
privilege should be enacted to protect clients' privacy.78 McCormick has sug-
gested that the use of the privacy rationale as a justification for recognizing
privileges is a "healthy and overdue development. 17 In addition, McCormick
noted increased support for privileges following the Supreme Court's recogni-
tion of constitutional protection for some aspects of privacy.80 A constitutional
right to privacy, whether based upon the federal or a state constitution, is an
uncertain basis for recognizing a privilege. Only a few courts have recognized
privileges based upon a right of privacy,"1 and generally the courts that have
recognized the right to privacy as a basis for a privilege also have recognized
that the right is not absolute and may have to yield to important governmental
interests.82 Although a constitutional right to privacy may not be an appropriate
basis for recognizing a privilege, recognition of a constitutional right does signal
76. Developments, supra note 23, at 1476-77.
77. L. BRAMMER, THE HELPING RELATIONSHIP: PROCESS AND SKILLS 64, 158-59 (1985).
78. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at § 105.
79. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at § 77.
80. Id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), rehearing
denied 410 U.S. 959).
81. Several factors may account for the limited success of using constitutional arguments to justify privileges.
First, "freezing" privileges in a constitution would prevent further development of privileges preventing examina-
tion of the underlying rationales and experimentation with privilege structures. S. KNAPP & L. VANDECREEK,
supra note 5, at 21; Saltzberg, supra note 15, at 604, n.15. Second, privileges may conflict with other constitu-
tional rights, such as the rights of defendants to obtain evidence under the sixth and fourteenth amendments, S.
KNAPP & L. VANDaCREEK, supra note 5, at 21; Saltzberg, supra note 15, at 604, n.14.
82. See, e.g., Betty J.B. v. Division of Social Services, 460 A.2d 528 (Del. 1983) (parent's right to privacy
must yield when a child's future well-being is an issue); In re N.H. v. District of Columbia, 569 A.2d 1179, 1184
(D.C. App. 1990) (District's interest in the welfare of a child is sufficiently strong to limit mother's privacy
rights).
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that privacy is an important value in our society. As an important nonlitigation
value, privacy is worthy of being recognized as a justification for establishing a
privilege apart from a constituitional basis.
C. Why Should the Privilege for Mental Health Professionals Be a Qualified
Privilege?
1. The Cost of the Proposed Privilege Is Reduced If the. Privilege Is
Qualified
Qualified privileges allow a case-by-case balancing of the need for informa-
tion in an individual case against the public policies favoring nondisclosure." In
contrast, absolute privileges apply regardless of the need for the evidence. 4 A
uniform, qualified professional privilege is flexible enough to cover many differ-
ent mental health professions without the danger of the loss of too much evi-
dence caused by an absolute privilege. An absolute privilege defined broadly
enough to cover all mental health professionals would be reckless because a
court would have to apply the privilege and exclude the evidence regardless of
the situation and the amount of training the mental health professional had. A
qualified privilege lessens the potential that a privilege will be used to deter the
court from a correct verdict by allowing the court to order disclosure whenever
the court believes disclosure is in the interests of justice.8
Although courts are flexible, one commentator suggests that legislatures
are the more appropriate branch of government to handle claims of a privi-
lege.86 Legislatures are not preoccupied by the results in a particular case. In-
stead, legislatures provide a forum for the necessary balancing of societal values
concerning privileges. However, as discussed previously, " legislatures have been
influenced by special interest groups and politics in the past.8 The proposed
privilege is a workable compromise between legislatures and the courts. For ex-
ample, legislatures can participate in creating privileges by specifying the type
of privilege, the holder of the privilege, the exceptions to the privilege, and the
types of proceedings in which the privilege may be asserted. By adopting the
privilege proposed in this article, legislatures would guide courts by providing
that this privilege is for mental health professionals, by establishing that clients
hold the privilege, and by listing exceptions to the privilege. Courts participate
in the process of creating privileges by applying the qualified privilege to the
specific facts in a proceeding. When applying the proposed privilege, courts de-
termine whether the professional services involved are covered by the privilege.
If legislatures establish a qualified privilege, this gives the courts general guide-
lines in applying the privilege, and the legislature reduces the loss of evidence
that an absolute privilege would cause.
83. See S. STONE & R. LIELtN, supra note 4.
84. See sources cited supra note 3.
85. 25 C. W1IGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 8, at § 5542.
86. Savrin, supra note 75, at 254-55.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30.
88. McCoRwcK, supra note 3, at § 75.
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Recently the Kentucky legislature took just such a step. The legislature
repealed the state's absolute privileges covering various mental health profes-
sionals and instead enacted a qualified privilege covering specific professionals.
Although courts do not have the flexibility to cover other professionals that the
proposed privilege would provide, Kentucky courts are able to weigh the inter-
ests of justice in determining whether the newly-enacted privilege should apply.
2. A Qualified Privilege May Provide More Certainty to Clients than
Absolute Privileges That Are Subject to Numerous Exceptions
Opponents may argue that a qualified privilege does not provide enough
certainty to further the purposes of the privilege. If the justification for creating
a privilege is to encourage clients to communicate with professionals or to pro-
tect a client's privacy, these opponents may argue that the purpose of the privi-
lege is undermined by providing only qualified protection rather than absolute
protection.8
Although opponents of the proposed privilege may argue that an absolute
privilege is necessary, proponents of the proposed privilege should respond that
a qualified privilege is necessary because the proposed privilege potentially cov-
ers many professions. Since the privilege potentially applies in many situations,
courts must be able to consider the interests of justice when applying the privi-
lege. A qualified privilege keeps the privilege from being used to deter the ccurt
from a correct verdict.90 Qualified privileges for mental health professionals are
not common, and therefore it is hard for opponents to make reliable generaliza-
tions about the effect of a qualified privilege.9' However, qualified privileges
commonly protect the confidential communications between journalists and
their informants. Informants have not been silenced by the potential that their
identity may be revealed if the underlying purposes of the privilege is out-
weighed by the circumstances in a particular case.9
Although expressly qualified privileges may not be as common for mental
health professionals as they are for journalists, some mental health professionals
are protected by absolute privileges with many exceptions.9" The proposed qual-
ified privilege would not provide any less certainty than absolute privileges with
many exceptions. One commentator has noted that these absolute privileges do
not seem to have had a detrimental effect on clients' willingness to disclose to
professionals, even though some privileges contain such a large number of ex-
ceptions that the privilege is rendered ineffective in almost any situation in
which it is likely to be asserted.94 Broad exceptions may cause more of a client's
89. See supra text accompanying notes 12-21.
90. S. KNAPP & L. VANDECREEK, supra note 5, at 37.
91. Id.
92. See S. STONE & R. LIEBMAN, supra note 4, at §§ 8.01, 8.09, 8.17.
93. E.g., CAL Evm. CODE § 1014 (West 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146 (West 1990); Okno Rlv.
CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Baldwin 1989).
94. Smith, supra note 13, at 502-24, 548-49; see, e.g., CAL EVID. CODE § 1014 (establishing a psychothera-
pist-patient privilege); CAL EVID. CODE § 1016 (exception when patient brings his mental condition into issue in a
legal proceeding); CAL EVID. CODE § 1017 (exception when a court appoints a psychotherapist to examine pa-
tient); CAL EVID. CODE § 1018 (exception when psychotherapist consulted to further a crime or a fraud); CAL.
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communications to be disclosed than if the privilege were qualified. If the pro-
posed mental health privilege were to be adopted, a judge could balance the
need for the testimony against the further damage that could be caused to the
client by having her confidential communications disclosed in a legal proceed-
ing.95 Therefore, a client may actually receive greater protection from a quali-
fied privilege than from an absolute privilege that has broad exceptions.
In addition to the exceptions that are specifically included in some "abso-
lute" privileges, all absolute privileges also have to yield to constitutional con-
siderations. For example, the sixth amendment guarantees criminal defendants'
rights to confront the witnesses against them." One important right of confron-
tation is cross-examination. To cross-examine a witness effectively, attorneys
may try to discover documents containing privileged information, such as excul-
patory evidence or statements inconsistent with the client's testimony. 7
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly held that a privilege may
not infringe on a defendant's right of confrontation, the Supreme Court has
indicated that a confidentiality statute may not interfere with a defendant's
right. In Davis v. Alaska,98 a trial judge did not allow a defendant to question a
witness about the witness' juvenile record because a state statute protected the
confidentiality of the records. The Supreme Court held that the confrontation
clause was violated by the statute when the effect of the statute denied the
defense an opportunity to impeach one of the prosecution's main witnesses.99
Thus, by failing to mention that the privilege may have to yield to constitutional
concerns, many absolute privileges provide a false sense of security to profes-
sionals and their clients.
In In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape,"'0 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court considered the constitutional implications of privileges when the court
EVID. CODE § 1020 (no privilege when psychotherapist's breach of duty is an issue); CAL EViD. CODE § 1022 (no
privilege when issue concerns a writing, such as a deed or will, of a deceased patient); CAL EvID. CODE § 1023
(no privilege when proceeding is to determine the sanity of a defendant); CAL EviD. CODE § 1024 (no privilege
when patient is a danger to self or others); CAL EVID. CODE § 1025 (no privilege in a proceeding to establish
competence); CAL EVID. CODE § 1027 (no privilege when psychotherapist is required to make a public report);
CAL EVID. CODE § 1027 (no privilege for patient under sixteen who is a victim of a crime).
95. For a discussion of a rape victim's need for confidentiality and the possible consequences of disclosing
the victim's communications in court, see In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 494 Pa. 15, 60-61, 428 A.2d 126,
146-47, 149 (1981) (Larsen, J., dissenting).
96. US. CoNsr. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . be
confronted with the witnesses against him.").
97. J. MYERS & N. PERRY, CHILD WITNESS LAW AND PRACTICE § 8.5 (1987).
98. 415 U.S. 308 (1974). See also G. WEISSEN EROER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 501.3 (discussing constitu-
tional limits on privileges).
99. Davis, 415 U.S. at 320; accord In re Robert H., 199 Conn. 693, 509 A.2d 475 (1986); Bobo v. State,
256 Ga. 357, 349 S.E.2d 690, 692-93 (1986) (discussing defendant's right to confrontation as applied to privileged
- communications); Annotation, Constitutionality, with Respect to Accused's Rights to Information or Confronta-
tion, of Statute According Confidentiality to Sex Crime Victim's Communications to Sexual Counselor, 43
A.L.R. 4th 395 (1985). However, the extent of the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation may be some-
what limited. "The Confrontation clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-
examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish." Delaware v.
Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985). In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51-54 (1987), a plurality of justices said
that the sixth amendments confrontation clause does not extend to pretrial discovery. The right to confront wit-
nesses is a trial right only and not a constitutionally compelled rule of pretrial discovery.
100. 494 Pa. 15, 428 A.2d 126 (1981).
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considered creating a privilege for rape crisis counselors. Rather than fashioning
a privilege that appeared to be absolute, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court cre-
ated a privilege for rape crisis counselors that balanced these interests. 101 The
court rejected the crisis center's arguments for an absolute privilege by recog-
nizing that "the prosecution must allow the defense to examine statements in its
possession given by persons who testify as prosecution witnesses."10 2 Like the
rape crisis counselor privilege established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
the proposed mental health professionals' privilege balances the interests of jus-
tice against the need for the relationship. The proposed privilege does not mis-
lead professionals or their clients.
Even when the privilege is qualified, other alternatives exist that may pre-
vent a client's communications from being disclosed in legal proceedings. One
alternative that offers protection is the prohibition against hearsay. Hearsay is
defined as an out-of-court statement introduced to prove the facts asserted in
the statement. 0 3 Depending upon how the professional's testimony is used, the
entire conversation between the professional and the client could be kept out of
court by the hearsay prohibition. For example, in Glisson v. State,0 4 the Court
of Appeals of Georgia recently refused to admit testimony by a school counselor
about alleged incidents of incest on the basis of inadmissible hearsay. 05 When a
party is seeking discovery from a mental health professional, a second alterna-
tive to relying on the privilege is for the professional to request a protective
order. Under Federal Rule 26(c), courts have broad discretion to protect a per-
son from "annoyance, embarassment, oppression, or undue burden or ex-
pense."' 0 6 The judge may weigh the burden of the counselor's testimony against
the need for the testimony under Rule 26 and determine that the burden on the
patient and the counselor is too great.
D. Why Should the Privilege Be a Uniform Privilege That Covers All Mental
Health Professionals?
1. Simpler for Clients to Understand
One advantage of the proposed privilege is that it is simpler for clients to
determine whether the privilege covers their relationships with professionals. In
Allred v. State,'0 7 a suspect accused of a crime wanted to speak to someone
from the treatment facility where he had received counseling. In that state, psy-
chotherapists were covered by a privilege but social workers were not. If the
suspect had understood the distinctions in application of the statutory privilege,
101. Id.
102. In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 494 Pa. at 27, 428 A.2d at 131 (quoting Commonwealth v.
Grayson, 466 Pa. 427, 428, 353 A.2d 428, 429 (1976)). See also Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 523 Pa. 427, 567 A.2d
1357 (1989) (disallowing access to victim's psychotherapeutic records denied defendant his right to confrontation).
103. McCoRmicK, supra note 3, at § 246.
104. 188 Ga. App. 152, 372 S.E.2d 462 (1988).
105. Glisson, 188 Ga. App. at 153-55, 372 S.E.2d at 464-65.
106. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); see generally J. FRIEDENrHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 413-15
(1985).
107. 554 P.2d 411 (Alaska 1976).
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he could have chosen to speak to the psychotherapist rather than the social
worker. If clients are more aware, the privilege will be more effective at foster-
ing communications with professionals than are current individual privileges.
The privilege will also be fairer in its outcomes because the determinative factor
of whether communications are privileged will not be the chance that an indi-
vidual spoke to a therapist rather than to a social worker.
2. More Equitably Covers All Classes of People
In addition to a qualified privilege being more effective because it is sim-
pler, professions with poorer clients or less powerful lobbies would also receive
protection from the privilege. Some commentators have argued for extending
statutory privileges beyond psychologists and psychotherapists. 0 8 They recog-
nize that by confining the privileges to high-paying professionals, the poor are
discriminated against because money may be the only determining factor in
choosing one type of professional over another. 09 For example, social workers,
crisis counselors, and parole officers could be covered by the proposed privilege.
Opponents may argue that adopting the proposed privilege will result in the
loss of too much evidence. Once a privilege is adopted to cover all groups that
claim to provide emotional care, it is difficult to explain why the privilege
should not extend to any relationship that provides emotional support. One com-
mentator noted that almost any kind of conversation is therapeutic and many
personal relationships are based upon satisfying the personal needs of the indi-
viduals involved."" For example, opponents who favor a privilege only for psy-
chotherapists and their patients ridicule the idea of extending the privilege to
other professions by proposing a privilege for beauticians and bartenders,'
Although opponents may assert that many relationships may provide emo-
tional support and that too much evidence will be lost by enacting the proposed
privilege, this is not true because the proposed privilege does not cover all rela-
tionships. When courts apply the proposed privilege, they will be able to prevent
the loss of too much evidence by considering the interests society has in foster-
ing the relationship in question.""2 One factor in considering the interest society
has in the relationship is the amount of training the mental health professional
has had. Although many relationships may have a therapeutic effect, not all
relationships should be protected. Some beauticians and bartenders may effec-
tively help their customers who confide in them, but a state should not protect
these relationships with a privilege. These untrained individuals are less likely to
be effective than individuals who have received training in counseling skills. Al-
though volunteers on suicide prevention lines or in other community programs
do not have the years of training that psychologists or psychiatrists have, basic
108. Savrin, supra note 75, at 245-54; Note, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in Washington: Ex-
tending the Privilege to Community Mental Health Clinics, 58 WAsmH. L Rav. 565, 574 (1983).
109. Savrin, supra note 75, at 253-54; Note, supra note 108, at 574.
110. Fisher, The Psychotherapeutic Professions and the Law of Privileged Communications, 10 WAYNE L.
Rav. 609, 645 (1964).
111. 25 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 5525, at 175-76.
112. See supra discussion under Part C 1.
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counseling skills can be learned in a very short period of time. Volunteers
should be included within the proposed privilege because volunteers at crisis
centers receive some training in basic counseling skills.113 This training is
designed to help them perform their role effectively, and the clients seeking
counseling from them are likely to expect that their communications with the
volunteer counselor will be privileged. In contrast, customers of bartenders or
beauticians are less likely to expect that their conversations will remain confi-
dential, especially if they take place in a crowded bar or beauty shop. "Image
counselors" are counselors who help clients design a new wardrobe, stand
straighter or speak better; these counselors may have some similarities to beau-
ticians, but image counselors may be more likely to be covered by the model
privilege if the need for their testimony is not great and if the client communi-
cated to the image counselor in confidence. A qualified privilege designed to
cover mental health professionals does not result in the loss of too much infor-
mation. The proposed privilege allows the court to carefully consider the com-
munications and the circumstances of the case to arrive at a correct verdict.
3. Eases the Burden in Conflict of Laws Decisions
When deciding whether a privilege should apply, courts performing a con-
flict of laws analysis usually consider the policy interests of the respective juris-
dictions which are connected to the litigation. 114 Usually the forum state has a
strong interest in accurately deciding the dispute."" However, the forum may
have no interest in applying the privilege rules of another state." 6 If the states
adopt a uniform privilege for mental health professionals, clients will have more
assurance that their communications will not be disclosed regardless of the fo-
rum involved.
V. CONCLUSION
Perhaps as a result of the political climate in state legislatures, privileges
for mental health professionals have developed inconsistently within many
states. Many mental health professions perform similar therapeutic functions.
However, psychologists and psychiatrists are more likely to be covered by statu-
tory privileges than are groups with less powerful clients, such as social workers
and school counselors.
One solution to the current patchwork development of privilege laws is to
enact a single, qualified privilege to cover all professions who participate in the
diagnosis or treatment of mental or emotional problems. There are several bene-
fits to enacting a single, qualified privilege. One benefit is that a qualified privi-
lege allows courts to perform a case-by-case analysis of the need for the infor-
113. Some states establish a minimum number of hours required for volunteer training. See, e.g., CAL EviD.
CODE § 1037.1 (1989) (40 hours); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146k (1990) (20 hours); NJ. REv. STAT. §
2A:84-22.14 (1990) (40 hours).
114. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at § 73.2.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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mation versus the policies supporting the privilege. A qualified privilege lessens
the potential that the privilege will be used to lead to an inaccurate verdict, and
a qualified privilege is necessary to prevent too much evidence from being lost
because the proposed privilege covers many professions. In addition, qualified
privileges provide no less protection than absolute privileges that are subject to
many exceptions and constitutional considerations. Another advantage of the
proposed privilege is that the privilege is simpler to understand, and this sim-
plicity will help clients to be more aware of the privilege. If a single, uniform
privilege is adopted by many states, the privilege will be easier to apply by
courts faced with performing conflicts of law analyses. Finally, a uniform, quali-
fied privilege is beneficial because courts, unlike legislatures, are more sensitive
to the potential loss of information caused by privileges and because courts are
less sensitive to political pressures.
Kerry L. Morse

